This paper studies long term relationships, modeled as repeated games, with restricted feedback. Players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history, as may be the case in online markets. Our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies. We derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) for perfect public equilibria and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the largest fixed point of a monotone operator. We use our characterization to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient trade in a repeated product choice game where costumers condition their purchase decisions only on the last performance signal.
Introduction
Consider a market in which a sequence of short lived costumers faces a long lived seller. The seller is tempted to provide a low quality good, but each transaction generates a signal about her performance. If costumers have access to the entire sequence of past performance signals, then the theory of repeated games Stacchetti 1986, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) allows us to characterize the equilibrium set and understand the conditions under which the seller's temptation to provide a low quality good can be moderated. However, assuming that a short lived costumer has access to all past signals seems demanding. For example, each party to an online transaction may acquire some, but not all, information about its counterparty's past behavior. Another example arises when costumers are part of a social network of information transmission and the costumer buying in the previous round can meaningfully convey his trading experience to the costumer buying in the current round, but the experiences of costumers further back cannot be communicated. This paper introduces a state strategy equilibrium framework where players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history. We provide a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with limited feedback in the form of arbitrary restrictions on strategies. The tools we develop can be useful for deriving comparative statics results and for solving for the set of equilibrium payoffs in applications.
Our main contribution is to extend the machinery developed by Stacchetti (1986, 1990) to an alternative equilibrium concept for repeated games, namely state strategy equilibrium, whereas several other papers have adapted it to richer dynamic settings, including games with a payoff relevant state variable (Atkeson 1991, Phelan and Stacchetti 2001) , games with private information Kocherlakota 2001, Fernandes and Phelan 2000) , repeated games with private monitoring (Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski 2005, Cherry and Smith 2009) , and games with hyperbolic discounting (Chade, Prokopovych, and Smith 2008) . Our state strategy equilibrium framework builds on the small literature on repeated games with restricted feedback, including the OLG model in Bhaskar (1998) , the repeated prisoners dilemma in Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) , and the repeated minority game in Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala (2007) , by providing a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs for a fairly general class of games. More recently, Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009) provide a folk theorem in one period memory strategies for repeated games with perfect monitoring and rich action sets, Mailath and Olszewski (2008) provide a folk theorem in finite memory strategies for perfect monitoring games, and Hörner and Olszewski (2008) also allow for imperfect monitoring. We complement this literature by characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs for fixed discount factor and memory restrictions (as encoded in the state space).
In Section 2 we present an infinitely repeated game and introduce a state space S such that the state s t ∈ S in period t ≥ 1 is drawn from a distribution Q(·; a t−1 , s t−1 ), where a t−1 ∈ A is the action profile in period t−1. A state is simply a summary statistic of past play. A state strategy for player i ∈ I is a sequence of functions (σ t i ) t≥0 such that σ t i maps states s t ∈ S into actions a t i ∈ A i . A state strategy equilibrium σ is a perfect equilibrium in state strategies. Our state strategy equilibrium framework is general enough to encompass repeated games with memory restrictions (as in Mailath and Morris 2002 , Cole and Kocherlakota 2005 , Liu and Skrzypacz 2009 , as well as more general repeated game strategies in which the history of play is summarized by a publicly observable state variable (as in Doraszelski and Escobar 2010, Ekmekci 2010) .
In Section 3 we show that state strategy equilibrium payoffs can be analyzed using recursive techniques similar to those introduced by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) . To this end, we introduce the set E of all functions v that map states into payoff vectors such that there exists a state strategy equilibrium σ for which v i (s) is player i's continuation value when play transpires according to σ and the initial state is s. Given an arbitrary set W of functions that map states into payoff vectors, we say that a function v is decomposed on W if there exists a function α that maps states into pure actions and a continuation value function w selected from W such that, in each state s, α i (s) is a best response for player i and results in a payoff of v i (s). We also say that v is decomposed by α and w ∈ W . It is therefore natural to define the set B(W ) of all functions decomposed on W . We say that W is self generating if W ⊆ B(W ) and prove that self generating sets are contained in E. Moreover, E = B(E) and therefore E is the largest self generating set. We also show that iterative application of the operator B results in a decreasing sequence of sets that converge to E.
Our main point of departure from the existing literature is that our objects of interest are functions that map states into vectors of continuation values (one value per player) and not simply vectors of continuation values. Our operator thus characterizes the set of all functions that can be decomposed using continuation value functions in a given set. This construction of continuation value functions allows us to properly eliminate the dependence of current play on past states.
The tools we develop can also be applied to solve for the set of nonstationary Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games as usually studied in applied work (Ericson and Pakes 1995) . In those games, the current state affects not only the transition probabilities but also the current payoffs. Our recursive characterization in Section 3 directly extends to this more general setting.
In Section 4 we specialize the model and consider strategies with one period memory. These strategies condition on a state drawn from a distribution that is parameterized by the actions in the previous period. Under an absolute continuity restriction on the monitoring technology, we establish a bang bang result stating that a function v decomposed by α and w ∈ W can also be decomposed by α andŵ ∈ W such that range(ŵ) ⊆ ext(co(range(w))), where range denotes the range of a function, ext denotes the set of extremal points of a convex set, and co denotes the convex hull of a set. As an application we deduce that an improved monitoring technology unambiguously expands the set of equilibrium payoffs and thus provide a result similar to that of Kandori (1992) for perfect public equilibria.
In Section 5 we apply our methods to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated product choice game in which players use strategies with one period memory. In our game, a short lived seller is tempted to produce low quality goods when facing each of the members of a sequence of short lived costumers. As in the existing literature (Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce 1991, Fudenberg and Levine 2009) , introducing a public randomization device facilitates the analysis. The set of equilibrium payoffs turns out to be surprisingly simple: For discount factors above a certain threshold, the set of equilibrium payoffs with one period memory coincides with the payoff set in perfect public equilibria, while below the threshold the unique equilibrium is to repeat the static Nash equilibrium. Our application shows when and how the dynamics of incentive provision lead to cooperative behavior when the most severe nontrivial memory restriction on strategies is in place. By fully characterizing the conditions under which this restriction does not bind, we are able to sharpen a finding of Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) . These authors consider a repeated prisoners dilemma and show when the set of equilibrium payoffs with finite memory strategies approaches the payoff set in strongly symmetric perfect public equilibria. We further demonstrate that a memory length of one is enough to sustain efficient trade provided the discount factor is above a given threshold.
Model

Set Up
We consider an infinitely repeated game with long and short lived players. Time is discrete t = 0, 1, . . . . The stage game is (I, (A i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I ), where I is the set of players, A i is a finite set of actions for player i, and u i : A → R is the payoff of player i. Players 1, . . . , n are long lived and discount period payoffs geometrically at a rate δ ∈]0, 1[. 1 Thus, given a sequence of action profiles (a t ) t≥0 , the discounted payoff of long lived player i is
where a t ∈ A is the action profile in period t. Players {n + 1, . . . , |I|} are short lived and maximize their current payoffs. Following Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) , a short lived player is active for one period and a new generation of short lived players enters the game in each period. We do not exclude the case n = |I| in which all players are long lived. At the beginning of period t ≥ 1, a signal y t ∈ Y is drawn from a distribution G(dy; a t−1 ), where
Lebesgue measurable. This setting corresponds to a standard repeated game of imperfect public monitoring.
State Strategy Equilibria
We add to the repeated game a measurable set of states S and a transition function Q(·; s, y) ∈ ∆(S) so that the state in period The state in period 0, s 0 , is drawn from a distribution q 0 ∈ ∆(S). We assume that for any measurable function w : S → R, w(s t+1 )q(ds t+1 ; a, s t ) is measurable as a function of s t ∈ S.
A state strategy for player i is a collection of functions σ i = (σ t i ) t≥0 such that in period t, after observing state s t , player i selects action σ t i (s t ) ∈ A i . The set of state strategies for player i is Σ i . A state strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈I is a state strategy equilibrium if for all periods t and all states s t , the continuation strategy (σ t ) t ≥t is a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game.
Let Equil be the set of state strategy equilibria.
A state strategy equilibrium may not exist. As usually done (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) , we assume the stage game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium a * ∈ A. It is not hard to see that repetition of a * is a state strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game.
Thus, Equil is nonempty.
It is important to point out that whether players know (or recall) the history of states (s 0 , . . . , s t−1 ) at the beginning of period t is immaterial because, when using state strategies, players condition on the current state s t so that s t fully determines current play and the distri-bution over continuation strategies. A state strategy equilibrium can thus be seen as a robust prediction in the sense that it applies even when players' recalls of past states are heterogenous and, in the limit, totally imperfect. In this sense, state strategy equilibria are robust to forgetting.
Examples
Several models fit into our state strategy equilibrium framework.
where Y is the set of signals, then the set of state strategy equilibria coincides with the set of perfect public equilibria (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) . In a perfect public equilibrium, each player can condition arbitrarily on the history of public signals but neglects her own private actions.
Example 2 (Finite Memory Equilibria) Consider a model in which players use finite memory strategies and condition on the last κ ≥ 1 signals y t as in Cole and Kocherlakota (2005 
The initial state s 0 is an arbitrary signal y 0 ∈ Y . State strategy equilibria of this model are perfect public equilibria with finite memory as studied by Mailath and Morris (2002) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) .
Example 3 (Markov Perfect Equilibria) Extend our model by assuming that the payoff to player i ∈ I, u i , depends not only on the current action profile a t but also on the current state s t .
This model is a dynamic game with payoff relevant public states as studied by Atkeson (1991) . A state strategy equilibrium of this model is a (possibly nonstationary) Markov perfect equilibrium as typically considered in applied work (Ericson and Pakes 1995, Acemoglu and Robinson 2001) . The recursive methods we develop in Section 3 (Theorem 1 and Proposition 1) carry over and can be used to analyze and compute the set of Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs. In contrast, Atkeson (1991) characterizes the larger set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs.
Equilibrium Payoffs
The key aspect of the definition of state strategy equilibria is the irrelevance of past states for continuation play. We are interested in characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs. To obtain our recursive characterization we must therefore consider richer objects than payoff vectors, namely functions that represent attainable equilibrium payoffs across different states. Working with such functions allows us to avoid any dependence of continuation play on past states.
For each state s ∈ S and state strategy σ ∈ Σ define the expected discounted payoff of long lived player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} as
where the probability measure over the set of histories is induced by σ and the initial state is
is the continuation value function and the set of equilibrium payoffs is the set of all such functions obtained from equilibrium strategies:
for all s ∈ S with a * being the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, it follows that v * ∈ E. Standard arguments (Stokey and Lucas 1989, Theorem 9 .2) can be used to check that functions in E are measurable. Thus E is a nonempty set of measurable functions.
Because the set E plays a key role in the subsequent analysis, we illustrate its construction with an example.
Example 4 Consider a prisoners dilemma with payoff matrix
Both players are long lived. To represent trigger strategies as state strategies, suppose that the state space is {On, Off} and
. It is easy to see that there are two state strategy equilibria. In the first of them, players always defect. In the second equilibrium, players cooperate when the state is On and defect otherwise. The set of equilibrium payoffs is therefore E = { 0, 0, 0, 0 , 1, 1, 0, 0 } where the first two components of a vector are payoffs in state On and the last two components are payoffs in state Off.
A Characterization of the Set of Equilibrium Payoffs
Since the short lived players behave myopically, it is useful to define the set B of all actions that are consistent with their static best responses:
n is measurable} be the set of all possible continuation value functions.
We also consider the set A i = {α i | α i : S → A i is measurable} of all functions that map states into actions for player i. We define the operator B, mapping a subset of continuation value functions W ⊆ W to a subset of continuation value functions B(W ) ⊆ W, by
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀s ∈ S .
The set B(W ) is the set of payoff functions that can be enforced in different states given that arbitrary continuation value functions w can be chosen from W . Constraint (i) ensures that the actions prescribed to short lived players are consistent with their myopic behavior. Constraint (ii) ensures that, given the continuation value function w i , long lived player i is willing to choose the prescribed action α i (s) and achieves the target payoff v i (s). When v, α, and w satisfy (ii) we say that v can be decomposed by α and w and when v ∈ B(W ), we say that v can be decomposed on W .
A key difference between our operator B and those previously proposed in the literature to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1986 , Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990 , Atkeson 1991 , Phelan and Stacchetti 2001 is that the definition of B imposes a continuation value function w ∈ W that applies uniformly on current states s ∈ S. The fact that the continuation value function w does not depend on the current state s means, to put it somewhat crudely, that the way in which incentives are provided in the continuation game does not depend on the current state s, although, of course, the current state s determines the distribution over next period's continuation payoffs w(s ). This aspect of the construction allows us to ensure that payoffs and strategies depend solely on the current state, as they must in a state strategy equilibrium.
To see this point more clearly, consider the recursive characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for dynamic games with payoff relevant states in Atkeson (1991 Atkeson ( , pp. 1078 Atkeson ( -1079 . Adapted to our setting with payoff irrelevant states, his operatorB, mapping a correspondencẽ W : S ⇒ R n to a correspondenceB(W ) : S ⇒ R n , is defined bỹ
Note first that the operatorB is defined on correspondencesW : S ⇒ R n , whereas our operator B is defined on a subset of continuation value functions W ⊆ W. Further note that in contrast to our operator B the operatorB has a product structure. Inspection ofB(W )(s) shows that there can be a different continuation value function w : S →W depending on the current state s ∈ S. Because equilibrium strategies are constructed inductively, the fact that the continuation value function depends on the current state implies that the equilibrium strategies condition on the entire history of states (s 0 , . . . , s t ). Hence, while the operatorB is useful to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, 2 it cannot be used to study equilibrium payoffs and strategies with restricted feedback.
We proceed to establish the main properties of our operator B. Let W ⊆ W be an arbitrary set of functions that map states into payoff vectors. We say that W is bounded if there exists κ > 0 such that |v(s)| ≤ κ for all v ∈ W and all s ∈ S. We say that W ⊆ W is self generating if W ⊆ B(W ).
Theorem 1 The following hold:
(i) Let W be self generating and bounded. Then W ⊆ E;
(ii) E is the largest bounded fixed point of B.
2 Strictly speaking, the operatorB characterizes the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs only when this period's state s t encodes last period's action profile a t−1 . More generally, the operatorB characterizes subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs that condition on the history of states (s 0 , . . . , s t ).
This and all other results in the paper are proven in the Appendix. The first part of the theorem is the state strategy version of Theorem 1 in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) . It shows that whenever a set W is contained in the set of all payoffs enforced by continuation values in W , then W is contained in the set of equilibrium payoffs. The idea behind the second part of the theorem is that, in equilibrium, continuation payoffs are also equilibrium payoffs. The innovation in the proof comes from the observation that as our operator avoids any dependence of continuation play on past and current states, we can construct equilibrium payoffs and strategies that depend solely on the current state.
Computing E by enumeration is typically infeasible as strategies may be nonstationary. Because the operator B is monotone (in the sense of inclusion), it readily provides us with an algorithm to compute its largest fixed point E. Assume that S is countable. Given any bounded set
The following result implies that the sequence (W ν ) ν∈N monotonically converges to E.
The proposition shows that by iteratively applying B to a properly chosen initial set, one can approximate the set of equilibrium payoffs arbitrarily closely. When |S| is finite, one way to operationalize the algorithm is by dividing each W ν into a grid and then checking whether B(W ν ) is close to W ν . This approach is straightforward but slow.
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Alternatively, one can add a randomization device to the model and consider the operator B(W ) = co(B(W )), where co denotes the convex hull of a set. In period t strategies condition on the current state s t and on the entire history of randomizations (ω 0 , . . . , ω t ). 4 The operatorB is monotone and convex valued and one can use methods similar to Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) to compute its largest fixed pointĒ. 5 More precisely, the algorithm fixes a number of
, where λ m ∈ R n|S| , and iteratively computes an inner (respectively outer) approximation ofB(W ν ) by finding its extreme points (v m ) M m=1 , where v m ∈ R n|S| , in all directions and then taking their convex hull (respectively intersecting the corresponding supporting hyperplanes). This algorithm effectively keeps track of M real valued vectors of length n|S| and updates them by solving M linear programs with n|S| variables subject to incentive compatibility constraints. Sleet and Yeltekin (2003) extend Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin's (2003) algorithm to compute the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of dynamic games with payoff relevant states.
Our algorithm is more burdensome than theirs because, as discussed above, the subgame perfect equilibrium problem has a product structure that allows to update the extreme point v m for direction λ m state by state. That is, the linear program decomposes into |S| smaller programs with n variables.
Strategies with One Period Memory
We specialize our model by equating states and signals and assume S = Y ⊆ R N and s t = y t .
Therefore, a state strategy is actually a finite memory strategy with memory one (henceforth, a one period memory strategy). One period memory strategies are attractive as they are the most severe memory restriction on strategies that makes the problem of long term relationships plausible. Bhaskar (1998) , Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala (2007) , and Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009) study alternative properties of one period memory equilibria.
The key property of one period memory is stated in the following lemma:
This lemma shows that in order to characterize B(W ) it suffices to characterize the maximal (in the sense of inclusion) range of the members of B(W ). As Example 4 shows, the lemma does not extend to more general state strategies.
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The bang bang result in the following proposition shows that the operator is fully characterized by the extremal points of the range of its members:
Proposition 2 Assume that S = Y is a set of positive Lebesgue measure in R N and that the distribution of signals G(dy; a) = q(dy; a) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure dy in R N . Let v : S → R n be decomposed by α ∈ A andw : S → range(w). Suppose there exists a bounded functionŵ ∈ W such that range(w) ⊆ co range(ŵ) andŵ ∈ B(W ) for some W ⊆ W. Then there existsw ∈ B(W ) such that v is decomposed by α andw, w(s )q(ds ; a) = w(s )q(ds ; a) for all a ∈ A, andw(s ) ∈ ext range(ŵ) for almost all s ∈ S.
This bang bang result is weaker than that for perfect public equilibria (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) . The recursive characterization of the set of one period memory equilibrium payoffs applies to sets of functions. Because in general no function in W has a range containing the range of other members of W , it may not be possible to decompose all possible continuation value functions by using continuation values that are extreme points of a set in R n ; instead, one may have to use continuation value functions with disjoint ranges. This observation is further illustrated in Section 5. Before moving on to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs in an application, we demonstrate the usefulness of our bang bang result for comparative statics.
Comparative Statics: Improving the Monitoring Technology
How does an increase in the precision of the signal impact the equilibrium set? Consider two different monitoring technologies, q(·; a) and q (·; a). We say that q is a quasi garbling of q if there exists a measurable function φ : R 2 → R + , such that φ(s ; x)ds = 1 for almost all x ∈ S, q (ds ; a) = φ(s ; x)q(dx; a) ds .
This definition corresponds to the natural notion of informativeness introduced by Blackwell (1951) , in which a signal distributed according to q provides more "precise" information about the actions than a signal distributed according to q . Note that the definition implies that q (ds ; a) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
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Proposition 3 Assume the distributions of signals q(dy; a) and q (dy; a) are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure dy in R N . Assume that q is a quasi garbling of q.
The idea behind the proposition is that if v can be decomposed on W with a monitoring technology q , then it is also possible to decompose v on W with an improved monitoring technology q. Denoting by E the set of equilibrium payoffs with monitoring technology q , the following comparative statics result follows by noting that E ⊆ B(E ; q):
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 3, E ⊆ E.
7 While definitions of quasi garbling that do not impose the absolute continuity of q can be given (Strassen 1965) , we require this assumption to derive the subsequent results.
A Product Choice Game
We use our results to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game with one period memory strategies. While we study a product choice game between a long lived seller and a sequence of short lived costumers, our methods and results extend to other settings such as the strongly symmetric public perfect equilibria of a repeated prisoners dilemma (Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce 1991, Cole and Kocherlakota 2005) .
Our product choice game has the following payoffs:
u, 1 where 0 < u <ū and g > 0. The seller (row player) is long lived and customers (column player) are short lived. The seller can exert high (H) or low (L) effort and the costumer can buy a high (h) or a low (l) quality product. Effort is costly for the seller. The customer prefers to buy a high quality product if the seller exerts effort, otherwise the customer prefers the low quality product. The unique Nash equilibrium of the one shot game is (L, l) and attains the minimax value for both players.
We study an infinitely repeated version of the game. Once the action profile a t in period t has been selected, x t+1 ∈ {0, 1} is drawn from the distribution
where 1 ≥ p ≥ q > r ≥ 0 andq(0; a t ) = 1 −q(1; a t ). We think of x t as being a signal about the performance of the seller. As in the received literature (Abreu, Milgrom, 
Perfect Public Equilibria
As Example 1 shows, a perfect public equilibrium can be seen as a state strategy equilibrium in which the state encodes the entire history of past signals. The tools introduced by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) can be applied to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in this repeated game. Let Π ∞ ⊆ R be the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs for the seller.
. Then
When δ < δ ∞ , the unique equilibrium is to repeat the static Nash equilibrium (L, l). When δ ≥ δ ∞ , the optimal equilibrium is in trigger strategies. In the first period, players play (H, h). In period t ≥ 1, players randomize, permanently playing (L, l) with positive probability after x t = 0.
One Period Memory Equilibria
It is natural to assume that costumers do not have access to the entire history of past signals. We thus apply our general results to investigate the equilibrium payoffs when players use strategies that depend solely on the current signal y t or, in other words, players use strategies conditioning only on the current realizations of the monitoring signal x t and the randomization device ω t .
This assumption contrasts with our discussion of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin's (2003) algorithm in Section 3 where we allowed players to condition play on the entire history of realizations of the randomization device. In the context of the product choice game, the current assumption ensures analytic tractability and is perhaps also more appealing from a conceptual viewpoint.
We consider the following condition that restricts the informativeness of the monitoring technology:
The relevance of this sort of condition to attain efficient economic transactions with memory restrictions has also been stressed by Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) and Liu and Skrzypacz (2009) . In contrast to these papers, we do not allow strategies to have arbitrarily long memory, but explore how Condition 1 allows efficient economic transactions when strategies are restricted to have one period memory.
Let Π
1 ⊆ R be the set of equilibrium payoffs for the seller that can be attained with one period memory strategies. The main result of this section is the following:
By stating necessary and sufficient conditions for v ∈ R to be an equilibrium payoff, this proposition fully characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs when strategies are restricted to have one period memory. It shows that this restriction is not binding in terms of what payoffs can be achieved if δ ≥ δ 1 . In doing so it refines Cole and Kocherlakota's (2005) finding by showing that in this case arbitrarily long memory is not needed to obtain the full set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs. When r > 0, δ 1 > δ ∞ and there is a range of discount factors for which the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs strictly contains the set of one period memory equilibrium payoffs, even when Condition 1 holds.
Proposition 5 illustrates the usefulness of our recursive characterization. Proving that v ∈ [u, v * ] is an equilibrium payoff when δ is sufficiently large can be done by direct albeit tedious calculation without using our tools (as shown by Cole and Kocherlakota 2005) . However, showing that a payoff v ∈ [u, v * ] cannot be attained when δ < δ 1 is not obvious and our recursive characterization allows us simplify this task by focusing on the dynamic programming problem of the seller.
To prove Proposition 5, we employ the tools introduced in the previous sections. Note that the state space is S = [0, 2], the set E contains functions of the form v : [0, 2] → R and the domain of the operator B is the set of subsets of measurable functions v : [0, 2] → R. Since the public randomization device is drawn from a uniform distribution, the realizations of y t are absolutely continuous and Proposition 2 allows us to characterize the set of functions B(W ) by the extreme points of the convex hull of the range of its members. We therefore simplify the problem by representing a set W containing measurable functions w :
Given w ∈ R 2 and ψ 1 , ψ 0 ∈ [0, 1], define
V 0 (ψ 1 , ψ 0 , w) is the expected payoff if the current action profile is (L, l) and the continuation values are given by the vector w. ψ 1 and ψ 0 are the cutoffs for the randomization in the next period; below these cutoffs the low continuation value w is applied. V 1 (ψ 1 , ψ 0 , w) is defined analogously if the current action profile is (H, h). A vector w = (w, w) ∈ R 2 , with w < w, may be used to enforce several profiles v = (v,v) ∈ R 2 . Profiles with v =v are not suitable to provide incentives for the seller to choose H. The set of all enforceable profiles withv > v is
Φ(w) is nonempty if and only if
and w ∈ C, where
We deduce that E = {(0, 0)} when Condition 1 does not hold.
We characterize Π 1 when Condition 1 holds. This characterization is derived in two steps.
Lemma 2 Suppose that δ < δ 1 . Then the unique equilibrium is to repeat the static Nash equi-
The idea behind this lemma is that to provide incentives, continuation values after x t = 1 must be sufficiently large compared to continuation values after x 0 = 0. But the distribution over continuation values cannot depend on the current signal (or more generally on the current state) and this puts an upper bound on how much variation we can impose on continuation values.
The proof of the lemma shows that these two bounds are not compatible when δ < δ 1 .
, and W = {v}. If δ ≥ δ 1 and Condition 1 holds, then W is self generating.
The lemma implies that {v * , u} ∈ Π 1 when δ ≥ δ 1 . Proposition 5 follows by showing that elements in between u and v * can also be attained in an equilibrium with one period memory.
Details are given in the Appendix.
From Lemma 3 we can construct the equilibrium strategies sustaining v * as
This strategy profile is stationary. When x t = 1, players play (H, h) with probability 1 as in the infinite memory case. When x t = 0, players choose (L, l) with probability g δ(p−r) ū−u+g which is strictly greater than the probability with which permanent play of (L, l) is triggered in the infinite memory case. This is so because in the former case the punishment consists of only one period of defection and therefore it must be carried out more often to provide incentives to produce high quality products. In other words, with infinite memory the continuation value in the punishment phase is harsher, but with finite memory punishment is triggered more often.
The public randomization device not only simplifies the analysis of the model but also plays a substantive role. Without it, the incentive constraint enforcing (L, l) imposes an upper bound on the discount factor δ, so that (H, h) can be enforced only for intermediate values of the discount factor. Moreover, in our model, unless u is sufficiently large or q is sufficiently larger than r, efficient transactions cannot be attained with stationary strategies and no randomization device regardless of the discount factor (Mailath and Samuelson 2006, Section 7.2.2).
8 As in Ellison's (1994) community enforcement model, the public randomization device allows us to fine-tune the severity of the punishment so that the incentive constraint enforcing the punishment profile (L, l) does not bind and payoffs in [u, v * ] can be attained.
Concluding Remarks
We ask how restrictions on strategies shape the extent to which players can use long term relationships to align private and public incentives. We show that the methods introduced by Stacchetti (1986, 1990) can be adapted to characterize equilibrium payoffs in a state strategy equilibrium framework. Our recursive characterization can be useful for deriving comparative statics results and for solving for the set of equilibrium payoffs in applications.
Private monitoring While our results apply to repeated games of public monitoring, they also have implications for repeated games of private monitoring. Mailath and Morris (2002) show that strict perfect public equilibria in finite memory strategies exhaust the set of equilibria that are robust to private monitoring. The set of equilibrium payoffs in one period memory strategies characterized in Proposition 5 is a lower bound for the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs that survives the introduction of a tiny amount of private monitoring. Phelan and Skrzypacz (2009) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a state strategy profile to be a sequential equilibrium of a private monitoring game and use their methods to check whether tit-for-tat is a sequential equilibrium in a private monitoring repeated prisoners dilemma. The results presented in Section 5 suggest that by introducing a randomization device, tit-for-tat may be an equilibrium without imposing an upper bound on the discount factor.
From one period to finite memory strategies While our recursive characterization in Section 3 covers general state strategy equilibria, our applications in Sections 4 and 5 leave a gap between one period and finite memory strategies. Our proofs of Propositions 3 and 5 make use of the bang bang result in Proposition 2, which itself is an implication of Lemma 1. Extending Proposition 2 to more general strategies with finite memory length κ seems promising (we have not been able to come up with a counterexample) but difficult. First, Lemma 1 need not hold. Second, the bang bang result one could presumably obtain is a conditional result in the sense that given the last κ signals, (y 1 , . . . , y κ ), continuation values, as functions of the next signal, y κ+1 , can be taken from extreme points of convex sets. 9 Such a result would at most simplify the problem by allowing us to manipulate continuation value functions that depend arbitrarily on (y 2 , . . . , y κ ) but in simpler "bang bang" way on y κ+1 . But this simplification is not enough to extend Propositions 3 and 5 because the arbitrary dependance of continuation values on all but the last signal renders the operator intractable. We leave these explorations for future research.
Consider an arbitrary v 0 ∈ B(W 
But W is bounded and thus (v T ) T ≥1 is a sequence of uniformly bounded functions. Taking the limit, we deduce that
Part (ii). We prove that E = B(E). The fact that E is the largest bounded fixed point then follows from part (i) and the fact that period payoffs are bounded.
We first show that E ⊆ B(E). Let v ∈ E and consider the corresponding equilibrium profile σ = (σ i ) i∈I . Define w : S → R by
where the expectation is with respect to the unique probability measure induced on the set of histories by (σ t ) t≥1 conditional on s 1 = s. By construction, the measurable function w belongs to E. Define α ∈ A by α(s) = σ 0 (s). Clearly,
This proves that v ∈ B(E).
Let v ∈ B(E). By definition, there exists α v ∈ A and w v ∈ E such that
Letσ = (σ t ) t≥0 be the state strategy profile generating the payoff w v ∈ E. Define the following state strategy
This defines a state strategy equilibrium and
Proof of Proposition 1.
Moreover, E ⊆ W n for all n and therefore E ⊆ ∩ n∈N W n . To prove that ∩ n∈N W n ⊆ E, we prove that ∩ n∈N W n is self generating. We observe that ∩ n∈N W n contains only measurable functions as each W n , by definition, contains only measurable functions. To prove that ∩ n∈N W n is self generating, let v ∈ ∩ n∈N W n . Then, for all n ≥ 1 there exists α n ∈ A and w n ∈ W n−1 such that for all s ∈ S, α n (s) ∈ B, and
Note that (α n ) n∈N and (w n ) n∈N have pointwise converging subsequences as both are contained in the product of compact sets (recall that A is finite and W 0 is bounded). Without loss of generality, we assume that (α n ) n∈N and (w n ) n∈N converge and denote by α and w the limit functions. By passing to the limit, it is easy to see that
Since w ∈ ∩ n∈N W n , it follows that v ∈ B(∩ n∈N W n ). In other words, ∩ n∈N W n is self generating and thus contained in E.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since range(v) ⊆ range(v), for all s ∈ S the set X(s) = {s ∈ S | v(s) = v(s )} is nonempty. The Axiom of Choice (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Section 1.11) implies the existence of a selection x : S → S such thatv(s) = v(x(s)) for all s ∈ S. For all i ∈ I, define now the functionα i (s) = α i (x(s)) which, being defined from S to the finite set A i , is a measurable function of s ∈ S. Observe that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
This implies thatv can be decomposed byα ∈ A and w ∈ W so thatv ∈ B(W ).
where co(A) is the convex hull of a set A ⊆ R n . The setΓ is nonempty and convex. Observe thatŵ ∈ B(W ) is bounded and, since the game has one period memory, has a finite (and thus closed) range. Therefore co(range(ŵ)) is a compact set (Rockafellar 1970 , Corollary 2.3.1). It then follows thatΓ is also weak * compact and the Krein-Milman theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 7.68) implies the existence of an extreme pointw ∈Γ. 10 We prove that w has all the properties stated in the proposition.
Claim 1 For almost all s ∈ S,w(s ) is an extreme point of co(range(ŵ))
To prove the claim, suppose otherwise. Then there exists a set of positive measure K ⊂ S such that for all s ∈ K,w(s ) is not an extreme point of co(range(ŵ)). Then, there exist w , w ∈ L ∞ (S, R n ) with w (s ), w (s ) ∈ co(range(ŵ)) such thatw = 1 2 (w + w ) and w = w for a positive measure set of states. Define w * = 1 2 (w − w ). We define the vector valued measure µ as µ(S ) = S w * i (s )q(ds ; a ) i=1,...,n,a ∈A . Since q(·; a ) is absolutely continuous, µ is a nonatomic measure. Therefore, Lyaponuv's convexity theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 13.33) implies that {µ(S ) | S is measurable} is convex. Therefore, there exists S such that µ(S ) = 1 2 µ(S).
10 The space L ∞ (S, R n ) is the dual of L 1 (S, R n ). The weak * topology on L ∞ (S, R n ) is the weakest topology such that for all g ∈ L 1 (S, R n ), the linear function f ∈ L ∞ (S, R n ) → f (s) · g(s)ds is continuous (w +w ) withw =w on a set of positive measure. This contradicts the fact thatw is an extreme point ofΓ. This establishes the claim.
The conclude the proof of the proposition, note that range(w) ⊆ range(ŵ). Lemma 1 then implies thatw ∈ B(W ).
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that v ∈ B(W , q ) and let w ∈ W and α ∈ A be such that for all s ∈ S, α(s) ∈ B and v i (s) =(1 − δ)u i (α(s)) + δ w i (s )q (ds ; α(s)) = max a i ∈A i
(1 − δ)u i (a i , α −i (s)) + δ w i (s )q (ds ; a i , α −i (s)) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Define w : S → R n by w(x) = w (s )φ(s ; x)ds . Fubini's theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 11.27 ) implies that w is measurable. Then, given any action profile a ∈ A, w (s )q (ds ; a) = w (s )[ φ(s ; x)q(x; a)dx]ds = w(x)q(dx; a).
It then follows that v is decomposed by α and w given the monitoring technology q. Finally, note that for each x ∈ S, w(x) ∈ co(range(w )), with w ∈ W . From Proposition 2, it follows that there existsw ∈ W such that v is decomposed by α andw given q. This proves that v ∈ B(W , q).
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider any v ∈ E ∩ C. In particular, v <v and therefore there exists w ∈ E ∩ C and ψ 1 , ψ 0 ∈ [0, 1] such that v = V (ψ 1 , ψ 0 , w). Thereforē , a condition that contradicts δ < δ 1 . Thus, E ∩ C is empty and consequently no element of E can enforce (H, h). it follows that both incentive constraints hold. It is therefore enough to verify that the two equalities hold. To see the first equality note that
The second equality follows analogously.
Proof of Proposition 5. It immediately follows from Lemma 3 that u and v * are equilibrium payoffs when δ ≥ δ 1 . We claim that ∪ n≥0 I n =]ū, v * ] where
Indeed, I n ∩ I n−1 = ∅, each I n is an interval, and inf{v ∈ I n } → u as n → ∞. Therefore, for any v ∈]u, v * ], we can find n and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that v = (1 − δ n )u + δ n λ(v * − η) + (1 − λ)v * .
Consider the following strategies: During the first n − 1 periods play (L, l), in period n play (L, l) with probability λ and play (H, h) with probability (1 − λ), for t > n, play according to the stationary strategies sustaining (v * − η, v * ) ∈ E. This strategy has one period memory and prescribes optimal behavior after each history. Moreover, by construction, the expected payoff for the long lives player equals v = (1 − δ n )u + δ n λ(v * − η) + (1 − λ)v * .
